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The Recession: Is It Over?
In our last analysis, which appeared in
the February issue of West Michigan
Magazine, we speculated that the reces
sion, which began last summer, would
soon end. At this time, however, there
are stU! conflicting signs concerning the
timing of the turnaround. While there
are some indications that the bottom has
been reached, there are other signs that
the recession is continuing but the de
cline is at a much slower pace. While it
will take several months to verify whether
or not turnaround is actually in progress,
the odds are that if the recession is not
already over, it soon will be.
In March, part of the uncertainty about
the timing of the turnaround revolved
around the extent to which economic
activity had been unduly depressed by
the weather in January and the extent to
which all or some of the improved per
formance in February represented a
"bounceback" from that While a num
ber of economic indicators have im
proved recently, others continue to
deteriorate. Among those that are be
having consistent with a turnaround are
retail sales, construction spending, prices
of sensitive commodities at the whole
sale level, along with some measures of
durable goods orders and unfilled or
ders. Other series, however, continue to
deteriorate, indicating that the recovery
is still in the distance. Among these are
leading indicators, personal and busi
ness bankruptcies, help-wanted adver
tising, and the unemployment rate. The
last two of these lag behind overall activ
ity, however, and would be expected to
deteriorate even in the face of a turn
around.
So far, the recession has had most, but
not all, of the trappings of the classic
downturn. The exception has been in
terest rates. Real Gross National Product
(GNP after adjustment for inflation) fell
sharply (about 4% seasonally adjusted
annual rate) during the last two quarters.
Unemployment has risen from 7% in
July, 1981, to 9%. Real final sales (GNP
less the increase in business inventories)
has fallen 2+% since the first quarter of
1981. Industrial production has declined
sharply as has the rate of utilization of
manufacturing capacity. Last, and worse
for Michigan, the housing and auto In
dustries are still in their own depreSSion,
and new housing starts are near rock
bottom levels, as are automobile assem
blies and sales.

These are the painful effects of the
recession. The benefit is the precipitous
rate at which inflation has declined. The
Consumer Price Index (CPI) has been
rising at about 1 % so far this year, com
pared with almost 9% last year. And
prices actually dropped, for the first time
in 17 years in March. Although inflation
will not continue at this low rate indefi
nitely, it appears that the cycle of ever
increasing inflation has been stopped.
The recent contract concessions in the
auto industry are symptomatic of the fact
that the back of inflation has finally been
broken.
At this point, with the exception of
interest rates, the fundamentals should
be in place for an upturn. Monetary pol
icy has been stimulative for almost six
months, and fiscal policy (federal tax and
expenditure policy) is becoming stimu
lative after being contractionary through
most of 1981. Also, business inventories
are coming under control, setting the
stage for increased production.
The "fly in the Ointment," so to speak,
is high interest rates which, although
much lower than they were last summer,
are still very high for a recession. The
major problem with interest rates is the
demand-depressing effect of the high
"real" (inflation-adjusted) interest rates.
Technically, real rates are nominal inter
est rates minus the inflation expected to
occur over the time period the rate is to
cover. For instance, if the rate on a one
year treasury bill is 13 % and the markets
expect inflation of 9% over the next
year, the real rate is 4%. In computing
real rates, however, some observers had
compared the short-term interest rates
of 13% to 15% around the first of the
year with the inflation rate of about 4%
on the CPI at that time and had con
cluded that the real short-term rate is a
backbreaking 9-11 %.
This analysis is wrong and misleading
for the following reasons. First, 4% is too
Iowa rate for future inflation. The recent
inflation rate on the CPI has been unsus
tainably low in recent months. Before
too long, the recorded rate will move
back up to the basic rate, which is now
around 8%. Also, the CPI is not a com
prehensive enough measure of inflation
for the whole economy. The GNP defla
tor is a better measure, and it rose at 9%
in 1981, before temporarily slowing
down in the first quarter of 1982. In ad
dition, as indicated above, the appropri
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ate inflation rate to use in computing the
real interest rate is the forward-looking •
expected inflation rate, not the past rate.
Thus, the real rate of interest is still very
high-about 4-5%-but much lower
than some observers have claimed.
One last note about the recession. It is
not only unfortunate because it is taking
such a terrible toll, but it was probably
unnecessary! It was the almost inadver
tent result of a combination of a mone
tary policy and a Federal fiscal policy
which were simultaneously tight (con
tractionary), because of their timing.
Originally, the Reagan Administration
had planned that fiscal policy would be
neutral. But after the enactment of the
tax cut in 1981, fiscal policy was thought
to be stimulative. So far, however, the
stimulative effects of the federal income
tax cuts have been offset by other tax
increases and by expenditure cuts. Thus,
it is a misconception that fiscal policy has
been stimulative. This misconception
arose out of the notion that a tax cut
program had been passed and that would
produce large budget deficits in the
future.
The real key to the fiscal-policy effect
on the demand for goods and services •
has been the timing of the cuts in Federal
expenditures and of the tax rate cuts that
have actually occurred. The expenditure
cuts had their effects first, redUcing total
demand, starting in 1981. Contrary to
popular belief, the tax cuts did not occur
in mid-1981 and, for the most part, have
not occurred yet. When they do, they
will have their impacts gradually. Thus,
fiscal policy has actually been contrac
tionary at the same time as the Federal
Reserve pursued a tight monetary pol
icy. Unfortunately, monetary policy has
alternated between tightness and ease
within the year, while achieving its (ap
propriate) targets for the year as a whole.
The effects of the timing of these policies
have been combined with the expecta
tion of large federal deficits in the future,
which have produced high interest rates
in advance. Those high rates have
crushed the housing market, contrib
uted to depression in the auto industry,
and cut into other areas of demand as
well. Thus, we have had the "crowding
out" of private demand, by Federal gov
ernment actions that were thought to be
stimulative, in advance of their actual A
occurrence. The result has been the worst . .
of both worlds.
(Continued on page 8)
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The reasons for the high interest rates
are still the Federal government's defi
cits, which are very high and expected to
be higher in the future, plus continued
high borrowing by business, along with
the increased risk of lending. Current
business borrowing is more involuntary
than planned in that firms are often bor
rowing to finance unsold inventories and
to make interest and dividend payments,
rather than expand in a planned way.
Another reason for the high interest
rates is the enormous risk of holding
bonds. When interest rates rise, bond
prices fall and holders can incur capital
losses (along with reduced buying power
due to inflation). In recent years, interest
rates and bond prices have been far
more volatile than in the past, and this
has increased the risk of holding bonds.
Add to all of this the increased risk of
default associated with loans and debt
securities these days, and the result is
high real interest rates. Economic recov
ery, smaller federal deficits, and higher
saving by the private sector will solve
most of the interest-rate problem, if they
can be brought about more or less
simultaneously.
The issue now becomes what, if any
thing, to do about the current situation.
At this pOint, stimulative actions by the
Federal government to effect a turn
around should be out of the question,
because the economy will be improving
before those actions would have their
impact. Thus, the effects of these actions
would occur only after they are needed.
But even worse than the prospect of pol
icy actions that are too late is the pros
pect of counterproductive actions.
Washington does not appear to be dom
inated by people who understand aggre
gate-demand management. The current
mood is to cut the Federal deficit to bring
interest rates down. To do this, Federal
fiscal policy will turn more contraction
ary than it is now programmed to be.
Very probably, then, when the Congress
finishes its attempts to control the deficits
and interest rates, effective tax rates will
have been raised again, one way or the
other, and some of the defense buildup
aborted.
These, of course, are the "easy" ways
to attempt to get the Federal deficit under
control. The opportunities to make the
really tough decisions that would get
Federal spending under control, and
which must be faced sooner if not later,

could well have been lost again as they
have so many times in the past. Raising
tax rates directly, or letting inflation do it,
and cutting defense spending are, of
course, the old game of "politics as
usual," and Federal spending will still be
out of control.
But these comments are addressed to
the priOrities of fiscal policy. The timing
is something else. Only the recent stale
mate over what to do has kept Congress
from engaging in 1930's DepresSion-style
economics of tightening fiscal policy and
redUCing total demand for goods and
services while the recession is still in
progress. It is probably just fortuitous,
then, that actions to correct the deficit
will be taken at a future time so that their
effects will not be felt until such time as
fiscal policy finally becomes stimulative
and the economy is well on its way to
recovery. What, then, should we do now?
The way some politicians talk, the per
sonal income tax cut that President Rea
gan asked for and got was the cause of
our current troubles. This is not true. The
cuts in the personal tax rates have only
succeeded in offsetting recent and ex
pected near term "bracket creep."
Bracket creep is the situation in which
your real income goes down but your
Federal personal income taxes go up!
The enormous deficits expected to occur
in the future are part of the problem. The
deficits are the result of a number of
factors. Among these are the excess tax
concessions that Congress added to the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
which were over and above the Presi
dent's requests, the underruns in expen
diture cuts, overruns in other expen
ditures, the reduction in income and tax
collections due to the recession, and re
visions in the overly optimistic and un
realistic projections upon which much of
the economic program had originally
been based. Except for a few specific
programs, the Federal budget has not
been cut as much as we have been led
to believe. Even with all of the talk of
expenditure cuts and associated tales of
woe, the Federal budget is running well
above President Reagan's target. In fact,
at apprOximately $730 billion for fiscal
1982, it is much closer to Jimmy Carter's
prOjection than to Ronald Reagan's.
Federal spending is up about $70 billion
this year, and that amounts to a rate of
growth in excess of the growth of the
overall economy, again!

The major concern now is not that the
recession will not end. It will, and there
wUl be no "depression." The concern
now is for the strained financial position
of some American families and business
firms. Business liquidity is at low levels
and is deteriorating, and business and
personal bankruptcies will continue at
high levels until after the recession is
over. As things now stand, it appears a
certainty that the recession will have
ended by late summer. By then, the sec
ond stage of the Administration's per
sonal income tax cut will be in effect.
This will give households an enormous
boost in buying power. The 10% reduc
tion in tax rates is expected to increase
personal disposable income by about
2% per month. This should be large
enough to offset the effects on the
households of the high interest rates,
higher state and local government tax
rates, and the reduction in government
support for college students, for middle
income taxpayers, at least. The recovery
will probably not be as strong as recov
eries usually are, because interest rates
will still be high by historical standards,
although they could be a good bit lower
then than they are now.
As for Michigan, none of our readers
need be reminded of the economic plight
of the state. Unemployment is over
16%-the highest in the country-and
the real disposable income of the people
is still dropping. Since the state economy
is still auto-related, and the domestic
auto industry is still cyclical, the state's
recovery must wait for the national re
covery. Thus, improvement in the Mich
igan economy is several months off.
This does not address the structural
situation in the auto industry, however.
There, fundamental changes in demand
and supply conditions have occurred
and will continue for some time. Al
though the industry will never regain the
employment levels of the past, there can
be cautious optimism that a combination
of factors will produce a healthier indus
try in the next few years. Among these
are the increased concern for quality,
improved productivity through easier
work rules and the increased use of ro
botics, and a marked slowdown in the
rise of autoworkers' wages, unit labor
costs, and car prices. Combined with a
strong backlog of demand, these should
produce a healthier auto industry in the
future.
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